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THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS. By Charles Grove·
Haines. New York: Russell & Russell, Inc. 1965. Pp. xiii, 388. $8.50.
Jurisprudence, that subdivision of legal thought relating to the
problem of determining what constitutes "law," has attracted the
attention of more people within the past two decades than ever before. Law professors, law students, and those engaged in the practice
of law, as well as persons one would not ordinarily believe to be
interested in the underlying concepts of state-prescribed norms of
conduct, are seeking an understanding of the basic nature of our
legal system.
Many factors have brought about this comparatively widespread
interest in the underpinnings of our law. Part of this "fundamentals
of law" orientation can be traced to the ever-expanding role played
by law in American society during the second half of the twentieth
century. Regulations prepared and administered by government are
constantly touching more aspects of day-to-day life. The points of
contact between individual action and legal mandates have been
steadily increasing in number for several decades. In addition, the
intensity of the clashes between individual actions and the commands of the law has tended to increase in magnitude. As more
Americans have been subjected to legal restraints, their desire to
learn more about the basic characteristics of the law has quite understandably been stimulated. The increased dissemination of knowledge resulting from an unprecedented quantum of formal education
has triggered what might be viewed as a chain-reaction response in
many Americans-the desire for more and more information about
their 01vn society and each of its component parts. For this reason,
commentators are paying more and more attention to the basic
factors which shape the principles of law expounded by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.
Warranting special attention in this trend is the proliferation
of material written by political scientists engaged in exploring the
techniques and processes employed by judges in arriving at decisions.1 These authors have stressed that in many instances the judge
does not confine himself to the demands of precedent and the
technical merits of the contentions urged by the litigants. Instead,
he may pay attention, in varying degrees, to how the available
alternatives would affect the relations. between the branches of the
government, as well as how those alternatives relate to national and
1. For an excellent discussion of the techniques employed by some Justices of the
United States Supreme Court to gain support for their personal positions from their
brethren on the Court, see MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964). The ap•
proach to law as a balancing of power positions between the different sectors of federal
and state government is vigorously presented in SHAPIRO, LAw AND POLITICS IN THE .
SUPREME CoURT (1964).
.
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personal objectives and standards as understood and accepted by
the judge. Economics, social organization, and political philosophy
often not only influence a court's thinking but also may be the
determinative factors in its ultimate decision.
The Revival of Natural Law Concepts, by Charles Grove Haines,
probes the history, content, and application of natural-law concepts
from ancient times through the 1920's. One who has been looking
for a clear, succinct, and well considered examination of the various
facets of natural-law philosophy will certainly regard this book as
a "find." Many authors have struggled to present a clear description
of the component elements of natural-law thought but have missed
the mark. Mr. Haines has scored a direct hit. He successfully captures
and conveys to the reader the chameleon nature of natural law,
discussing its changing character since its initial appearance in early
Greek thought. Carefully and with a strong hand, the author guides
the reader through the shifts in emphasis, objectives, and manner
of application expounded by the proponents of natural law. Haines
thus contributes to the reader's appreciation of the fact that legal
systems do more than simply adjust grievances among individuals.
The norms of conduct administered by the law-makers reflect man's
groping for a body of rules which he can use as a measuring rod to
ascertain the propriety of his acts; this urge to seek out a body of
basic standards is the crux of natural-law philosophy. By the time
one completes his reading of this volume, he cannot contest the
conclusion of the editors of the Harvard Studies in Jurisprudence
that this work has well earned a place in that esteemed collection
of writings devoted to the examination of legal philosophy.
What is natural law and where does it come from? What are its
directives and how has it been applied? When compared with other
legal philosophies, how has it fared? In what way has it been used
to shape the development of American law and how much influence,
if any, will natural-law concepts have on the future content of
American law? Each of these questions is studied in The Revival of
Natural Law Concepts.
Some Greek and some Roman philosophers placed "law" into nvo
categories. One was man-made law-those norms established by
human beings for use at a particular time and place. Not all of man's
"laws," however, were to be treated in the same fashion. Some were
to be respected while others were to be rejected. The second category
was the frame of reference for determining the propriety or impropriety of mankind's prescribed standards of conduct; in other words,
a superior body of rules determining right and wrong. This higher
law, according to natural-law theory, circumscribes man's law-making power. It provides the guidelines which fallible mankind is
obliged to observe. Under this conceptT those norms formulated by
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men which violate such superior mandates are not to be treated as
law. State directives which fail to comply with basic standards of
correctness are not "law" and need not be obeyed.
During the Greek and Roman period, the natural-law theory
was invoked as a rationale by those who were dissatisfied with the existing order. Indeed, throughout subsequent history it has been used
repeatedly by the malcontents, the proponents of change, the alienated-to employ the current nomenclature used by the existentialist
thinkers and their progeny to depict those who reject what society
has to offer. "Out-groups" have insisted time after time that there
is a higher body of law than that laid down by mankind and that
higher law entitles them to gain entrance to, or replace, the "ingroups." However, this is just one aspect of the manner in which
natural-law thinking may be utilized. It has also been employed to
inject into existing law the kind of elasticity essential to the efficient
and acceptable functioning of a nation's legal system. It has served
as an escape tube through which legal concepts can be eliminated
when they become unsatisfactory. Conversely, it has been invoked
to establish or retain certain economic, political, and· social concepts
which, although favored by the law-makers, are in need of a
philosophical foundation upon which they can be sustained.
Advocates of the natural-law theory do not always agree with one
another as to the source of natural-law principles. Some take the
position that there are certain divinely created directives which
govern human conduct and which are immutable as well as universal.
Others approach natural law by de-emphasizing, or even omitting
all reference to, a supreme being. They stress man's power to reason
logically and to observe his environment. All of these concepts
converge on the premise that one need only look about him to
discern the basic standards of proper human conduct. Some naturallaw theorists rely upon theological literature, some concern themselves with the manner in which events take place, and others find
the basic standards of propriety in the presumed desiderata of mankind.2 The common characteristic of each of these branches of
natural-law philosophy is the subjective manner of determining the
content of natural law. This subjectivity has permitted the supporters of natural-law philosophy to urge different results simultaneously. For instance, some advocates of individual liberty have
urged that individuals should be permitted to pursue their personal
goals with a minimum of governmental intervention. Others have
insisted that only by the government's playing an active part in the
functioning of society will individuals be abkto enjoy the freedom
2. A well reasoned argument for support of this philosophy of law is the underlying
theme of FULLER, Tm: MORALITY OF LAw (1~64).
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essential to the pursuit of their aspirations. Both of these theories
have been supported on the basis of natural law.
The chapters in this book which will probably have the greatest
attraction for the constitutional-law enthusiast are those which explore the role that natural law has played in the development of the
doctrine of judicial review. The author finds an application of
natural-law theory in the principle that the judiciary possesses the
power to oversee, within certain self-imposed limits, the activities
of the legislative and executive branches of the government with a
view to determining whether their acts violate a constitutional
mandate. Haines exposes the reader to a fascinating exposition of
the history of constitutionalism-the doctrine that there is a higher
law in reference to which the judiciary can competently and rightfully determine the enforceability of laws devised by men. The
Magna Carta, Lord Coke's opinion in Doctor Bonham's Case,3 in
which that jurist insisted that the standards of conduct ordained by
the king as well as by Parliament were subject to a higher law, and
Blackstone's assertion that there was a superior law are each, in
the author's opinion, illustrative of the natural-law approach to
man-made law.
Supporters of the American Revolution boldly asserted that it
was correct, by the tenets of a higher, unwritten law, for the colonists
to seek their freedom from the mother country. These men were
influenced by the concept of natural law; they insisted that a higher
law granted individuals certain rights which no human being (even
a king), or any collective body of human beings, such as Parliament,
could deny. It is not surprising that Mr. Chief Justice Marshall,
having been exposed to this philosophy, grasped the opportunity in
Marbury v. Madison 4 to assert that the Constitution vested in the
judiciary the power to determine the validity of congressional legislation. That assertion was clearly consistent with the belief of the
leaders of the Revolution that the Constitution of the new republic
acknowledged the concept of a higher law. In the place of a higher
unwritten law, Marshall concluded, the Constitution itself had been
selected as the basic frame of reference which the judiciary was
obligated to use in determining whether governmental action was
lawful.
During the course of the nineteenth century, the breadth of
acceptance of natural-law thinking waxed and waned. The concept
of inalienable rights, which had played such a prominent role in
3. 8 Co. Rep. 114, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610). Coke's insistence on the supremacy
of a higher law, which was to be applied by the judiciary to invalidate certain acts of
the king and parliament, did not become a part of the English constitutional system,
Instead, under English law, the parliament is supreme. Sec generally Mortensen v.
Peters, 8 Sess. Cas. (5th Ser.) 93 (Scot. Ct, Justiciary 1906).
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

March 1966]

Recent Books

961

rallying the people to storm the Bastille and reject the French
monarchy, all but disappeared in France after the revolution had
run its course. As the battle lines slowly formed in the United
States between the antagonists representing the conflicting attitudes
of the North and the South, there was a resurgence of concern with
natural law and inalienable rights. Those who urged that the
southern states had a right to secede from the Union appealed to
"states' rights," a doctrine based upon a "higher law." Abolitionists
insisted that the institution of slavery was wrong in the very nature
of things and had to be extinguished. The assertion that the Union
was supreme indicates strongly a rejection of the higher-law philosophy so vehemently asserted in the l 770's as a rationale for the
American Revolution.
Following the Civil War, the natural-law concept merged with
the economic theory of laissez-faire to give rise to an approach to
constitutional law which dominated the American scene for many
decades. This was the political-economic concept that the due
process clauses contained in the Constitution severely restricted the
power of the federal and state legislatures to regulate contract and
property rights. Mr. Haines expounds at great length upon the
period he refers to as "conservative"-the period when the Supreme
Court struck down statutes directed at curbing individual activity
viewed by many as deleterious to the best interests of the nation.
Laws subjecting private action to public regulation were considered
by "conservative" members of the Court to be violative of the liberty
guaranteed to individuals by the Constitution.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, many of those who
concerned themselves with the meaning of law and the obligations
of the members of society to observe the commands of the state
turned away from natural law and looked to other bases of law
which appeared to them to be more consistent with the milieu of
the age. Those who espoused the "positivist" approach rejected the
idea of a higher unwritten law, and instead defined law narrowly
to embrace only those mandates proclaimed by the state. What the
state commanded was law; what the state did not command, insisted
the positivists, was not law. The content of the law was clear-cut and
easily discernible. The state was the sole and final arbiter of right
and ·wrong.5 Like the positivists, the followers of the "historical"
school of law denied the existence of universally appropriate rules
of human conduct. They insisted that the content of the law of each
nation was unique to that entity, being predicated upon the
5. Mr. Haines presents the positions of Kant and Hegel with regard to the
supremacy of the state at pp. 237-38. For a critique of the positivist school, as well as an
argument that natural law is• essential if excesses of power are to be avoided, see
SHUMAN, LEGAL POSITIVISM (1963).
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characteristics of its people, such as their collective past experiences
and their aspirations. 6
Positivism, rather than natural law, took hold in many areas of
the law in the early part of the twentieth century. The author
places the objectives of those who fought for the revival of natural
law in the twentieth century into four categories: (I) to infuse into
the law ethical concepts which law-makers might othenvise omit;
(2) to provide law-givers with a sense of direction toward the attainment of sought-after ideals; (3) to have judges and legislators
acknowledge the existence of a body of laws superior to any which
they might personally select; and (4) to place some outermost limits
on state action.
Natural law has attracted many ardent followers since the 1930's.
Following World War II, the victorious powers revolted from "positivism run rampant," which characterized the Hitler regime, and
invoked natural-law concepts in their decision to conduct the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. An examination of the judicial
opinions pertaining to these proceedings quite clearly indicates that
an idea of a "higher law" set the tone for the trial and conviction
of those who had led the Axis cause.7 The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on December 10, 1948, clearly embraces natural-law attitudes.8 The decisions of our own Supreme Court since the early
1950's in such matters as civil rights, 0 the rights of those accused
of crimes,10 and representation of the electorate in the federal and
state legislatures11 illustrate an attitude that law is based on some
standards of propriety beyond any specific precedents or mandates
of carefully drawn statutes; these standards may even be contrary to
some of the wishes of many members of the community.
One cannot help coming away from reading The Revival of
Natural Law Concepts with a feeling that he has substantially benefited from an excellent exposure to one of the basic components of
current legal philosophy. The materials contained in this book
assist one to become quickly attuned to judicial decision-making in
the 1960's. It has long been recognized that even the most primitive
6. A discussion of the basic precepts of the historical school appears at pp. 68-70. In
Haines' opinion "the historical school of jurisprudence set about to destroy all vestiges
of the ideas of natural law or natural rights." Id. at 70. Historical jurisprudence is
dealt with at length in NoRTIIROP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL ExPERIENCE
(1959).
7. See The Niirnberg Trial 1946, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946); In re Yamashita, 827 U.S. 1
(1946).
8. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. R.Ec. 8d Sess., Resolutions 7l(A/810) (1948),
9. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 847 U.S. 488 (1954).
10. E.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
11. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 58~ (1964) (state apportionment); Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (congressional districting).
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social organizations utilize law as a tool to mold the kind of social
organization that the members of the group-at least those who
possess the power to make policy--desire. However, of more recent
vintage is the widespread willingness of many people to use the law
as a technique of formulating new norms of conduct rather than
simply as an instrument to reinforce pre-existing doctrines. When
analyzed at some distant time in the future, the present epoch may
very well be referred to as the "Age of Law." Students, professors,
Ia-wyers, and laymen alike can gain an excellent insight into one of
the guiding forces of this era by reading Mr. Haines' volume. For
those who tend to shy away from books devoted to an examination
of legal philosophy, I am happy to report that the undesirable
characteristics frequently found in books dealing with this sector of
the law are entirely lacking in this well-documented and readily
comprehensible work. Those who plan to read this volume have an
enjoyable and enlightening adventure ahead of them. I suggest
that the attractive and well-marked journey through The Revival of
Natural Law Concepts be started at once.

Edwin W. Tucker,
Associate Professor of
Business Administration,
The University of Connecticut

